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Abstract
One important issue in firms’ governance is how to create incentives so that activity centres
can become more efficient. In this paper, we first introduce an agency contract where the
salary of the manager of an activity centre that produces an intermediate product is dependent
of its performance. Secondly, we add competition within the organization. This latter point is
new in the literature. We then develop a "static analysis" comparing a firm that has only one
activity centre producing an intermediate product with another firm that has two activity
centres producing the same intermediate product, in a context where the technology
manifests increasing returns to scale. We conclude that the introduction of internal
competition makes the firm globally more efficient, even though it cannot fully explore the
existence of increasing returns to scale.
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1. Introduction 
Microeconomics studies markets as a complex system where firm are assumed as “black 
boxes” that transform inputs into outputs. But the micro scale is unable to predict firms’ 
internal reorganization in result of market dynamics. Since firms only exist while they 
perform that input-output transformation in a way more efficient than the market (Coase, 
1937, Conner, 1991), we need to perceive firms as complex networks of sub-systems that 
trade between them goods (out of the market). For each sub-system, a number of inputs are 
bought in the market while other inputs are produced inside the firm by other sub-systems. 
The analysis of the efficiency of these sub-systems, designed as activity centers, is one of the 
basic concerns of the management accounting and control systems (Kaplan and Cooper, 
1998). In order to promote an efficient allocation of resources it is necessary to determine a 
transfer price for each intermediate good (Atkinson, 1987). 
The determination of transfer price, as well as the corresponding distribution of costs, is 
identical to the macroeconomic determination of the price by a central planner (Ijiri, 1968, 
Livingstone, 1969, Farag, 1967, 1968, and Kaplan, 1973), which uses the input-output 
analysis of Leontief (1941). According with this perspective, the organization is managed 
centrally, where activity centers are planned in order to maximize the overall profit. 
Being firm complexity identical to market complexity, due to the imperfect information it is 
impossible to compute the efficient transfer prices, Hayek (1945). Even though firms’ smaller 
size reduces this information difficulty, the absence, within the organization, of competition 
magnifies it.  
When, as standard, activity centers do not have internal competition they do not have 
incentives to disclose their private information. Due to secrecy requirements (e.g., of 
technology details) external competition does not significantly affect firms’ activity centers. 
Since the curve of production possibilities of activity centers (the efficient curve) is not 
revealed, manager is unable to determine the efficient transfer price. Hence, the activity 
center gain depends, to a great extent, on its capacity in generating "false information" and in 
using its market power within the organization. This perspective, although partially covered 
by the agency theory (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, Rajan, 1992), has been little explored in 
literature. 
In this work we use a new perception of the internal allocation of resources by using models 
known from the industrial organization. We compare the allocation of resources in two 
organizations that have to produce an intermediate good. In the first organization the 
intermediate good is produced by a single activity center, i.e. the activity center is  an 
“internal monopolist” while in the second organization the intermediate good is produced by 
two identical activity centers, i.e., we have an “internal duopoly”. By using numerical 
simulation, we conclude that, even when there are technological increasing returns to scale, 
the existence of competition inside the firm increases the overall efficiency of the 
organization. 
 
2. Theoretical model 
Assume a firm that produces one intermediate product and two final products. The firm is 
organized in three activity centers. One activity center produces the intermediate product 
while the other two produce the final products. Denote the intermediate output by I1 and the 
final products by  F1 and F2. The firm produces each final product using two inputs: the 
intermediate product  I1 and input  I2, which is acquired in the market (e.g., energy). The   2 
intermediate product I1 uses two inputs, the work of the manager responsible for this center, 
L, and input I2 (see figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Firm’s production layout 
Assume also that the technology is Cobb-Douglas. The two final products use a technology 
with constant returns to scale, while the intermediate product uses a technology with 
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where I2,o denotes the quantity of input I2 used in the production of the intermediate product, 
Ii,j denotes the quantity of input Ii used in the production of the final product Fj, L denotes the 
work of the manager and A0, A1 and A2 are constants. The market demand curves of the two 






2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
p b a D
p b a D
                    (2) 
where pi is the price of the final product Fi and a1 and a2 are constants. The price of input I2, 
traded in a perfectly competitive market, is given by w2. It is assumed that the transfer price 
of input I1 is the average cost of production, w1. The average cost of production depends on 
both the cost of input I2 and the salary of the manager. The salary of the manager is equal to a 
fixed component,  W0, plus a variable component, which increases with the output of the 
intermediate input I1 and depends on the difference between the standard cost, w1
s, and the 
cost of production excluding the variable component of the salary, w1
f, where w1
f = (I2,0 w2 + 
W0)/I1. Hence, the salary of the manager is given by: 
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=       (4) 
Since the transfer price of the intermediate product equals the actual average cost of 
production, the activity center obtains not profit. Therefore, the profit of the firm, p, equals 
the sum of the profits of the activity centers that produce the final products,  p1 and p2. 
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Using (1) and (2), the profit function of the activity center that produces the final product F1, 
p1, is given by: 
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After simplifying (7), we obtain the demand of inputs I1 and I2 by the activity center that 
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In a similar way we obtain the demand of inputs I1 and I2 by the activity center that produces 
the final product F2. The demand of input I1 is then given by: 
2 , 1 1 , 1 1 I I I + =                       (9) 
Using expressions (1) and (4), the actual average cost at the activity center that produces 
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Considering (3), and assuming that the disutility of effort is given by k2￿L
2, the effort exerted 
by the manager at the activity center that produces input I1 results from the resolution of the 
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It is worth noting that the effort exerted by the manager alters (using expression 10) the actual 
average cost at the activity center that produces input I1, while this changes (using expression 
8) the demand of inputs I1 and I2 by the activity centers that produces the final products. The 
final solution to the problem results from the resolution of the system of non-linear equations 
represented by expressions (9) and (11).   4 
3. Properties of the model 
We start with considering the case where there is only one activity center producing the 
intermediate product I1. We use simulation methods because the analytic manipulation of the 
problem is difficult and removes clarity. Future research might explore the analytic properties 
of the model. 
 
Case 1 (There is only one activity center producing the intermediate product I1) 
In this case, the activity center that produces the intermediate product acts as a monopolist. 
Hence, the demand is given by expression (9).  
Assuming that w1
s = 2, w2 = 1, A0 = 2, A1 = A2 = 1, a = b = j = 0,5, x = 1.1, W0 = 1, k2 = 1, a1 
= a2 = 5 e b1 = b2 = 1, we next represent the profit of the firm, the average cost of the 
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Figure 3: Effort exerted by the manager 
Since that the activity center that produces the intermediate product is monopolist, the effort 
the manager exerts is relatively small, unless the owner of the firm pays to the manager a 
relative high percentage of the difference between the standard cost and the actual cost. The 
simulation results show that the profit of the firm is maximized when the owner pays to the 
manager, as a variable component of the salary, approximately 35% of the difference 
between the standard cost and the actual cost. Hence, the manager increases his effort and the   5 
average cost reduces. In a sense, we obtain a better congruence between owner interests and 
manager interests. 
 
Case 2 (There are two activity centers producing the intermediate product I1)  
One way of reducing the market power that results from the fact that there is only one activity 
center producing the intermediate output is by introducing another competitor within the 
organization. In this case, each activity center might have a different average cost of 
production. Moreover, the activity centers that buy the intermediate products choose first the 
center that practices a lower average cost. In figure 4 we represent the organization of the 
activity centers. 
 
Figure 4: Firm’s production layout 
In this case, each activity center producing the intermediate product produces only a part of 
the demand of input I1. Assuming that the average cost and the quantity produced at activity 
center (0, j), j = 1, 2 are, respectively, w0,j and I0,j, the overall average cost of the intermediate 
product, which will be used by the activity centers that produce the final products, is given 
by:  
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Where I1 = I0,1 + I0,2 As observed above, it is assumed that the activity center that has a lower 
average cost produces a higher quantity. Moreover, the distribution between the two activity 
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Considering the same values used in Case 1, except that W0 = 0,5 (w1’ = 2, w2 = 1, A0 = 2,  
A1 = A2 = 1, a = b = j = 0,5, x = 1.1, W0 = 0,5, k2 = 1, a1 = a2 = 5 e b1 = b2 = 1), we next 
represent the profit of the firm, the average cost of the intermediate product and the effort 














Figure 5: Increase of the profit and decrease of the average cost of the intermediate output 











Figure 6: Increase of the effort exerted by the (two) managers responsible for the activity 
centers that produce the intermediate output 
 
As figure 5 shows, the profit of the firm is maximized when the owner pays to the two 
managers, as a variable component of the salary, approximately 35% of the difference 
between the standard cost and the actual c ost. More importantly, the profit of the firm 
increases when we introduce competition, although there are increasing returns to scale in the 
production of the intermediate output (x = 1.1). 
 
4. Conclusion 
It is well known that the absence of competition in the markets induces a loss of economic 
welfare. Similarly, within organizations, the market power that results from the fact that an 
intermediate product is produced by a single activity center induces an inefficient allocation 
of resources. This occurs because the activity center does not have incentives to disclose 
information concerning the (efficient) curve of production possibilities. Consequently, the 
power to impose the transfer price is the main factor affecting the allocation of resources.  
Although it might be a priori more efficient to use a single activity center to produce an 
intermediate input when there are increasing returns to scale, in this work we show that this is 
not always the case. Thus, comparing a firm that has a monopolist activity center producing 
an intermediate product with another firm where the same intermediate product is produced   7 
by two activity centers, we show that, even if there are increasing returns to scale, the firm 
might become more efficient duplicating activity centers. 
The great question we should pose is to know how the production processes should be 




Alchian, A. A. and H. Demsetz (1972) “Production, information costs, and economic 
organization” American Economic Review 62, 772-95. 
Atkinson, A. A. (1987) Intra-firm Cost and Resource Allocations: Theory and Practice, The 
Canadian Academic Association: Toronto. 
Barney, J. B., e W. Lee (1998) “Governance under uncertainty: Transaction costs, real 
options, learning, and property rights”, Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management: San 
Diego. 
Coase, R. (1937) “The Nature of the Firm” Economica 4, 386-405. 
Conner, K. R. (1991) “A historical comparison of resource-based theory and five schools of 
thought within industrial organization economics: Do we have a new theory of the firm?” 
Journal of Management 17, 121-54. 
Farag, S. (1967) Input-Output Analysis: Application to Business Accounting, Center for 
International Education and Research in Accounting: University of Illinois. 
Farag, S. (1968) “A Planning Model for the Divisionalized Enterprise”  The Accounting 
Review, 312-20. 
Hayek, F.A. (1945) “The Use of Knowledge in Society” American Economic Review 35,  
519-30 
Ijiri, Y. (1968) “An Application of Input-Output Analysis to Some Problems in Cost 
Accounting” Management Accounting, 49-61. 
Kaplan, R. (1973) “Variable and Self Service Costs in Reciprocal Allocation Models” The 
Accounting Review, 738-48. 
Kaplan, R. and Cooper, R. (1998) Cost and Effect: Using integrated cost systems to drive 
profitability and performance, Harvard Business School Press: Massachusetts.  
Leontief, W. (1941) The Structure of American Economy, 1919-1929, Harvard University 
Press: Cambridge, (Second Ed. 1951, Oxford University Press: NY). 
Livingstone, J. L. (1969) “Input-Output Analysis for Cost Accounting, Planning and Control” 
The Accounting Review, 48-64. 
Rajan, M. (1992) “Cost allocation in multi-agent settings”, The Accounting Review, 527-45. 
Sanchez, R. (1998) “Uncertainty, flexibility, and economic organization: Foundations for an 
options theory of the firm”, DRUID Summer Conference: Copenhagen Business School. 